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This paper discusses the narratives regarding (un)employment which emerged before, during and 
after German reunification in the East German town of Zwickau. Previous research in the 
anthropology of postsocialism has argued that the experience of work in socialism provided a 
foundation for East Germans to contest the viability of modern capitalism. However, I argue that 
such a “social” alternative has been to a large extent defeated by neoliberal hegemonic discourse. I 
do so by focusing on the narratives of worth and worthlessness in relation to employment, as well 
as the processes that shaped these narratives. First, I briefly present my field site and elaborate on 
the methods of my field research on the automotive industry in Zwickau. Second, using the life 
story of one of my informants, I show the disparity between personal experiences of dispossession 
and individual moral economic dispositions. Finally, I discuss the heightened moral and social 
importance of work in postsocialist former East Germany, the turbulence of its labour market since 
1989, the process of welfare state retrenchment, and the narrative of labour shortage as factors 
which paved the way for the establishment of neoliberal hegemony. These developments, I argue, 
also contributed to framing issues of employment in individual rather than structural terms. 
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Introduction: doing fieldwork in Zwickau 
 
This paper originated from a PhD thesis focused on industrial transformations in former East 
Germany and their role in restructuring the social and political relations in the region. The data 
were gathered over the course of one year of ethnographic fieldwork in Zwickau, a town located in 
western Saxony on the river Mulde at the foot of Erzgebirge (Ore Mountains). The population of 
the town is 88,972 (as of June 2019). As in many other East German towns, the population of 
Zwickau has been shrinking and ageing rapidly since the end of the socialist state (a period known 
as the Wende) in 1990.3 Such “shrinking cities” have proven to be fruitful sites for anthropological 
inquiry on postsocialism and postindustrialism. Ringel’s (2018) research in Hoyerswerda, to name 
one, focuses on how members of this urban community deal with the “loss of the future”. However, 
unlike Hoyerswerda, Zwickau can hardly be described as “postindustrial”.  
The economy of the Zwickau region was decisively shaped by coal mining and the textile, 
automotive, and electronics industries. After an almost 800-year history of coal extraction, mining 
activities ceased in 1977 due to exhaustion of the coal deposits. Many of the former miners took 
new jobs in the automotive industry, despite the common stereotype among the “native” 
automotive-industry workers that miners lacked the skills needed for the more sophisticated and 
often delicate work with the car components. The textile industry did not survive the Wende, 
resulting in abandoned industrial districts not only in Zwickau but also in the neighbouring towns 
of Werdau, Crimmitschau, Glauchau, and Meerane. The collapse of the textile industry, which was 
mainly female-dominated, contributed to the differing unemployment levels of men and women in 
Zwickau. The automotive industry in the region proved to be the most resilient. This industry has 
been a key source of livelihood for the people in the region since its beginning in 1904, when 
August Horch opened his first automobile factory in town. Later he left the enterprise, but due to a 
legal fight with the investors, he lost the rights to the original name “Horch” and had to come up 
with a new name “Audi” (the Latin translation of his name). From then on there were two car 
factories in Zwickau and two groups of car workers – “Horcher” and “Audianer”. Some of my 
older informants had learned their profession and worked at one of these enterprises. In 1958 the 
former Horch and Audi plants were united under the name of VEB4 Sachsenring Automobilwerke 
Zwickau. Sachsenring became famous for its iconic Trabant car, which was produced up until the 
1990s with only slight changes and improvements.  
Even before the Wende, the company Volkswagen, led by Carl Hahn,5 saw an opportunity in the 
region. In 1988, the four-stroke engines for the VW Polo, which were also installed in the Trabant 
1.1, were produced in the Barkas-Werke in Chemnitz. After German reunification in 1990, the fate 
of Sachsenring was in the hands of the Treuhandanstalt,6 which divided it into 26 enterprises, 
closed down most of them, and privatized the rest. The direct successor of Sachsenring was bought 
                                                     
3 The Wende (“turning point” or “transition”) was the process of socio-political change in 1989–1990 that led to the end 
of the socialist regime and establishment of parliamentary democracy as well as to the reunification of East and West 
Germany.  
4 The VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb), or state-owned enterprise, was the main form of ownership of industrial enterprises in 
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region was the fact that he was born in Chemnitz, although he had spent most of his life in West Germany. His personal 
connection with the region has also been emphasized in his memoirs, Meine Jahre mit Volkswagen (“My Years with 
Volkswagen”), and in the media.  
6 The Treuhandanstalt (often referred to simply as the Treuhand) was a government agency established in 1990 that 




in 1993 by the Rittinghaus brothers, who planned to turn it into an automotive supplier under the 
name Sachsenring Automobiltechnik GmbH. The enterprise went bankrupt in 2002, and charges 
were raised against the Rittinghaus brothers for falsification and deliberate bankruptcy. Since then 
the enterprise has passed from owner to owner and gone through a series of bankruptcies, in the 
course of which most workers lost their jobs.  
Volkswagen took over a small plant in Mosel (a suburb of Zwickau), where the Trabant 1.1 was 
produced, and built an enormous new plant right next to it. Many former Sachsenring workers 
found new jobs there. In contrast to the Sachsenring successor, Volkswagen remained a fairly 
stable employer and its workers gradually became the local aristocracy of labourers, despite 
persistent differences between the East and the West in working hours.7 Today, Volkswagen 
employs 8,000 people in Zwickau and supports approximately 30,000 additional jobs in the 
automotive supplier industry in Saxony.8 In the midst of the region’s deindustrialization, the 
investment was framed by VW as paternalistic philanthropy and an act of salvation for East 
Germans, and most of my informants would agree that “without VW, the region would not 
survive”. However, significant challenges still lie ahead of the automotive industry in Zwickau 
since VW’s decision in 2017 to rebuild the plant entirely for the production of electric cars. 
Given its rich history and its crucial role for the development of the region, the automotive 
industry in the Zwickau area presents an exceptional case for anthropological research into the 
social implications of industrial transformation. Moreover, shifting the focus from the more 
familiar postindustrial East German settings to highly industrialized Zwickau allows us to go 
beyond the narrative of “losers of the transition” and see the complex relationship between the 
industrial transformations under modern capitalism and the local cultural and historical context. In 
particular, I focus on subjective experiences of inequality, power relations, and how they play out 
at the local level while simultaneously translating into larger-scale frustrations and political 
outcomes. With these social struggles in mind, during my fieldwork in Zwickau I focused on the 
development of the automotive industry throughout its postsocialist transformation and on the lives 
of former and current automotive-industry workers.  
In my fieldwork I opted against shop-floor ethnography and decided to conduct my research 
mostly outside the factory walls. The reason for that lies in my research question, which implies a 
focus not only on the implications of industrial transformations for those directly employed at the 
factory but also on the social and political development of the whole town. In addition, conducting 
my research outside the factory allowed me to preserve full control over my data and prevent 
workers from becoming suspicious and withholding information because of the official access 
granted to me by plant management. During my fieldwork, I also found out that not being tied 
down to one place allowed for a broader view of the whole context – the various relations between 
institutions and groups of workers, as well as their connection to the rest of the town’s population. 
Moreover, it allowed for a deeper embeddedness in the town life of Zwickau itself. Nevertheless, 
choosing this approach over, perhaps, a more structured shop-floor ethnography came with some 
                                                     
7 The collective wage agreement (Tarifvertrag) for Volkswagen workers in Saxony stipulates a 38-hour work week, 
whereas the work week is only 35 hours for their Western colleagues. See:  Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis). 2018. 
Tarifinformationen zur Metall- und Elektroindustrie. Available at  
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Arbeit/Verdienste/Tarifverdienste-Tarifbindung/Publikationen/Downloads-
Tarifverdienste-Tarifbindung/tarifinformationen-metall-pdf-0160012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
8 Press release, Volkswagen Sachsen GmbH: Zahlen und Fakten: https://www.volkswagen-
sachsen.de/content/dam/companies/de_vw_sachsen/dokumente/pressemitteilungen/Zahlen%20und%20Fakten%202019.p
df, updated January 2019. 
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challenges. Because my informants were not all located in one place and did not constitute a closed 
group, I needed to be creative with my fieldwork techniques and methods. 
In the first weeks of my fieldwork, I established contact with the friends of the museum 
association (Förderverein) of the August Horch Museum dedicated to the history of the automotive 
industry in Zwickau; these volunteer supporters mostly consisted of former Sachsenring engineers. 
Thanks to this, I came in contact with additional former Sachsenring employees and was able to 
work in the museum’s archive. In addition, I found it helpful to immerse myself in town life and 
participate in various public events, which helped me build personal networks and find more 
informants through them using the snowball method. I would always explain that I was interested 
in the lives of automotive-industry workers in Zwickau, and my interlocutors would often offer a 
few names and contacts of the people I should talk to.  
During my fieldwork, I also participated in various political and public discussions, roundtables, 
and public events; many of these were held in connection with the municipal, state parliament 
(Landtag), and EU elections in 2019. Listening to the questions that people posed to their local 
politicians and public figures gave me insight into the local “hot topics”. I would often approach 
people after the event and start a conversation, especially if their questions were connected to my 
research topic, and some of those people later became my informants. Through these events, I 
established contacts with local politicians and conducted interviews with some of them. Extensive 
help with finding informants and also with providing valuable local knowledge came from the 
Zwickau division of IG Metall, the metalworkers’ union.9 Several of my informants who were 
active in the trade union also helped me get permission to visit VW and a couple of VW supplier 
factories and gave me a tour. 
In Zwickau, I lived in a multigenerational house (Mehrgenerationenhaus), where students and 
the elderly live under one roof (but on different floors), and the common spaces are used by both 
younger and older tenants. There I joined a project that encouraged the younger tenants of the 
building to help the elderly in a variety of everyday tasks such as grocery shopping and going on 
walks, as well as providing foreign language and computer skills lessons. I also posted a notice on 
the bulletin board in my building, introducing my research and encouraging the people who used to 
work in or were connected to the automotive industry to reach out to me. Through these activities, I 
connected with the inhabitants of my building and found some informants. With some of them I 
carried out formal interviews as well as informal chats while having a coffee in a café downstairs 
or their apartments.  
I also met many of my informants by merely living in Zwickau, sometimes in some rather 
surprising settings. For example, I joined a group that gathered once a week for practising dancing. 
This was initially meant to be a purely recreational activity, but after a few sessions I discovered 
that about a half of the men there were Volkswagen shop-floor workers, some of whom used to 
work in Sachsenring. The group would often meet outside the dance hall, and after a while, we 
became friends and also had a few formal interview sessions and visited each other’s homes. 
Building up these social networks took some time but proved to be crucial for my fieldwork, even 
though the practical relevance of these contacts for my research was not always immediately 
obvious. 
                                                     
9 IG Metall, the German metalworkers’ union, is part of the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, or DGB). Most of the automobile-production workers and the automotive-supplier workers are 
represented by this union. 
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Lastly, I established contact with a local journalist and managed to publish a short article about 
my research in both online and printed versions of the regional newspaper Freie Presse. As a result 
of this article, I was contacted by a few people who turned out to be great informants and whose 
experiences were very different from the people I had met previously. Discussions with my 
previous informants about the published article also encouraged some of them to share more of 
their stories. My methods of finding and contacting research participants might be best described as 
“parachuting” into different groups, settings or institutions and then finding connections between 
them. Most of the steps I took were highly situational and determined by the context I was in, but 
they all provided me with essential pieces of the puzzle.  
 
Between Winning and Losing: Mr Baumann’s story 
 
“I wasn’t one of those disappointed [die Enttäuschten] during the Wende”, emphasizes Mr 
Baumann10 as we talk about unemployment, sitting in a common room of the multigenerational 
house where we both lived. “I didn’t fall into a hole, like many other people, most of the people. 
You know, when they don’t tell you what to do every day, and you don’t know where to go and 
what to do.” He then used another example (which was supposed to be “closer to home” for me as 
a Bulgarian citizen) and described his trip to postsocialist Bulgaria and how he would see the 
farmers smoking and chatting instead of working on the fields. “They couldn’t deal with this 
freedom! They needed to be told every day what to do”, he said. Unlike these farmers, Mr 
Baumann thinks of himself as having been well-prepared for the transition – he had received higher 
education in East Germany, and he had read Marx and knew that capitalism has its price. He 
seemed to take pride in his adaptability during the transition as he contrasted himself to those who 
were too lazy, lacking initiative and flexibility: 
 
“And then came the Wende and everyone said that we get the freedom now, and we get this 
and that. And now they were all suddenly unemployed. Yeah, the ‘shitty West’…You said the 
‘shitty East’, and you took to the streets, now you are saying ‘shitty West’. What do you want 
then? You want only the best from both systems. But you don’t want to work. When they 
were told that they had to sweep the streets, because of the high unemployment, do you know 
how many of them declined those jobs? Why is such a man sent home and gets his money 
anyway? That’s unfair.” 
 
Listening to Mr Baumann, I found it fascinating how he managed to combine citing Marx and 
blaming the workers for their misfortunes in the capitalist system in one monologue. But what I 
found even more confusing was how Mr Baumann’s own work history suggested a completely 
different attitude to unemployment and the unemployed, as he himself had experienced a sudden 
and unfair fall into unemployment on the new labour market.  
Mr Baumann was born in 1943 in a family of bakers in a rural area of the Erzgebirge not far 
from Zwickau. During the socialist period, he received higher education and worked for a 
distributor of East German cars – VEB IFA-Vertrieb, part of the Industrieverband Fahrzeugbau 
(“Industrial Association for Vehicle Construction”, or IFA). In the early 90s, a Western investor 
came to the region to build car dealerships, and Mr Baumann got a job as a local manager. For 
                                                     
10 Pseudonyms are used throughout. All quotations from interviews and discussions have been translated from German 
by the author. 
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years, he worked on establishing contacts and opening new branches of the company in the area. 
He especially emphasized the respect and status he enjoyed: “They didn’t buy from this Wessi 
asshole, they bought from Baumann! I was their person of trust here at the company”.  
One day in the early 2000s, Mr Baumann was travelling for work and suddenly had a heart 
attack while driving his car. Fortunately, he had time to pull over, was transferred to a hospital 
quickly, and managed to survive the incident. However, 14 days into his rehabilitation, his work 
contract was terminated, and he was laid off. As his health slowly recovered, Mr Baumann turned 
to a labour court to file a claim about the unjustified termination of his contract, which brought him 
nothing, as the judge decided that no violation had occurred. In our conversations, he stressed a few 
times that his employer, the labour court judge, and his lawyer were all “Wessis” (a colloquial and 
sometimes disparaging term for West Germans). Mr Baumann also insisted that his story was not 
that unusual at that time. His early retirement at 58 had a detrimental effect on his physical and 
psychological health as he went through long periods in which he did little but sit at home and had 
trouble communicating even with his family. “Can you imagine something like that? From a speed 
of 180 to zero? I couldn’t sleep at night when I came back home [from rehabilitation]”, he said 
emotionally.  
As Mr Baumann found various social, cultural, and volunteer activities to keep him busy again, 
he gradually started to feel better, and today he leads a very active social life. When we arranged 
our meetings, he would often stress how busy his calendar was. Mr Baumann was 76 at the time of 
our conversation, and he lives together with his wife in a small two-room apartment in a retirement 
home. He became relatively famous and respected in town for his work in the archives and 
dedication to studying the town’s history. He sings in a choir, plays several musical instruments 
and actively participates in almost all of the events happening at the retirement home.  
While telling me his story, Mr Baumann took pains not to sound as if he wanted to complain: 
“Do I sound like I’m complaining? I don’t want to, because I’m doing fine.” In 2017, before the 
beginning of my fieldwork, he had attended a public discussion with a politician and a member of 
the Saxony parliament and shared the same story there. “She didn’t believe me at first, you know! 
But there were my former colleagues there who supported me and said: ‘Mr Baumann is telling the 
truth’,” he remembered. Shortly after, his story was featured in a newspaper article about the event. 
He showed me the article, in which he had crossed out with a black pen all the information that he 
found inaccurate. One quote from Mr Baumann, regarding the unfairness of how he was treated by 
the court, included a warning to others to “stay alert”, not trust anyone and not to wait for 
“presents” from above. He thought these words were taken out of context, and the article made him 
look like he was whining (meckern) and blaming the system. “I felt so embarrassed when I saw the 
article!” he exclaimed.  
In her ethnography of a postsocialist East German enterprise, Müller (2007) discusses and 
contrasts the careers of two managers, Oswald and Wolpert, in the market economy. Wolpert fully 
complied with the company’s code and adapted to the market economy’s ethics of efficiency, 
whereas Oswald stuck to the norms and values of the planned economy. Wolpert’s adaptation and 
Oswald’s refusal to adapt to the new market-driven ideology resulted in two different outcomes: 
Wolpert was respected by his bosses from the West and managed to have a successful career, 
whereas Oswald was asked to resign before his retirement. In this example, Müller showed how 
compliance with the new rules of the game meant success, whereas resistance brought failure. My 
own ethnographic data show a slightly different picture. The willingness to accept the ideals of an 
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“enterprising self” (Makovicky 2014) did not always reflect the personal experiences of my 
interlocutors. On the contrary, as Mr Baumann’s case shows, education, adaptability, and moral 
values did not prevent him from experiencing unemployment and falling into the same situation as 
the “lazy, sluggish” workers whom he condemned. Yet this experience did not change his very 
negative attitudes towards the unemployed, as he believes that the reasons for their misfortunes are 
very different. 
In this paper, I look at the narratives and experiences that contributed to silencing the 
dissatisfaction with neoliberalization in East Germany. In particular, I focus on the questions of 
worth and worthlessness, as they “serve to both obscure and reveal the relational mechanisms of 
alienation, dispossession, and de-valuation of labour upon which capitalist valorisation is based” 
(Kalb 2013: 14). I argue that the postsocialist transformation in East Germany has become an 
ultimate test of worth, which has divided people into “winners” and “losers” – those who have 
succeeded in the new system and those who have failed to adapt. I see this division as emic rather 
than etic; it is subjective but nonetheless important. “I have never been unemployed” was the proud 
phrase I often heard from my informants. Among my informants in Zwickau, the ability to 
maintain one’s status and avoid gaps in employment became a marker of self-worth, and the story 
of the postsocialist transformation was often reduced to a matter of personal strength of character. 
This can also be explained by the unwillingness of even the victims of neoliberalism to be 
associated with an ultimate “loser of the transition” – the postsocialist working class, often depicted 
as demoralized, lazy and unadaptable.  
The concept of internal orientalism, as discussed by Buchowski (2006), may be useful in this 
regard. According to Buchowski (2006: 465), postsocialist workers and peasants have been 
orientalized as the “losers of the transition” as opposed to the civilized “(post)modern Western 
liberals”. In the context of Germany, we can speak about the need to subject the allegedly unfree, 
authority-seeking Easterners to a process of “normalization” that makes them more like the free, 
democratic Westerners. This dominant discourse of an enterprising self transforms the workers into 
“orientalized Others” who supposedly lack the courage, creativity, and determination to become 
entrepreneurs and were spoiled by the poor work discipline under socialism (Kideckel 2002).  
Contrary to this orientalizing discourse, in her ethnography of a Polish factory after 
privatization, Dunn (2004: 7) argues that the historical experience of socialism and its cultural 
system allowed the workers in Poland to contest, modify, and reinterpret many initiatives of 
multinational corporations. In other words, they were able to be more critical towards capitalist 
production thanks to their experience of socialist work. Similarly, in her comparative study of East 
German and Hungarian workers, Bartha (2014) argues that the East Germans were more likely to 
explain the anomalies of capitalism through structural reasoning, than the Hungarians. Nostalgia 
(or Ostalgie, nostalgia for the East), she concludes, became a means of legitimate social criticism 
of capitalism for the workers in Jena. By the same token, Dale (2006: 220) suggests that German 
reunification produced a revival of social movements, which “have placed debates over the 
viability and desirability of capitalism back onto the political agenda”. However, in my field site 
this observation was only true for the active trade union members or those with very strong leftist 
views. Therefore, drawing on my ethnographic data, I intend to call this thesis of the “East German 
alternative” into question. I do so by exploring neoliberal hegemonic narratives which emerged 
after the German reunification and resulted in a certain decrease in solidarity, as well as 
(self-)orientalization of East Germans. 
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The Meaning of Work in East Germany 
 
The importance of work in the perceptions of personal worth and worthlessness is of particular 
interest in postsocialist contexts. In socialist East Germany, officially known as the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), employment was guaranteed by the state. It was not only a 
constitutional right but also a duty (Jancius 2006; Rudd 2006). A significant part of socialist 
ideology revolved around work and its meaning for human life. It was shameful not to have work, 
but, thankfully, the system guaranteed employment. This guarantee provided a strong sense of 
security among the workers and placed a major part of the responsibility for the distribution of jobs 
on the state. With the introduction of a market economy, the circumstances changed, and the new 
state was unable to fulfil the promise of work that had existed in the GDR. However, the moral 
implications of (un)employment persisted. Globalization, the rise of precarious labour, and 
postindustrialism have transformed the workers’ lives everywhere in the world. But because of the 
overwhelming centrality of work under socialism, shifts in the experience of work under modern 
capitalism have been even more marked in postsocialist contexts than they were in the West 
(Stenning, Smith, Rochovská, and Świa̧tek, 2010: 81). As Bartha (2014: 309) puts it, the workers in 
postsocialist countries faced “the double challenge of the decline of the political weight and the 
significance of the working class and the devaluation of production work in a postindustrial 
society”. 
In a conversation about how work had changed after the shift to a market economy, one former 
Sachsenring engineer drew my attention to the difference between the concepts “Job” and 
“Arbeitsplatz” (a word that can refer to both one’s job or position as well as the physical 
workplace). A job for him was something temporary and alienating, whereas the Arbeitsplatz was 
associated with permanence and a deep sense of personal connection between the worker, his or 
her work, and the enterprise. For him, a job belonged to capitalism, whereas the Arbeitsplatz 
belonged to socialism. Arbeitsplatz was, perhaps, more embedded into social life, and the Job 
represented the disembeddedness of Western capitalism. The very precariousness of a job comes 
from disconnecting it from the person of the worker, who becomes disposable and interchangeable. 
The distinction between the disembedded and embedded labour was often mentioned by my older 
informants, who had spent a large part of their working lives in a socialist factory. Spittler (2009: 
173) has argued that the dichotomy and distinction between “embedded” work in non-capitalist 
societies and “non-embedded” work in capitalist societies is far less clear than it is often suggested 
by the scholars. However, I would argue that for the automotive-industry workers in Zwickau the 
contrast was indeed very pronounced. For them, the sudden commodification of labour and its 
emergence as a “fictitious commodity” (Polanyi 2001) on a competitive market was felt very 
intensely.  
In the GDR, work was central in all spheres of life, including the private sphere: health, leisure, 
and family life were all closely connected to the workplace. And the larger the enterprise, the more 
its influence extended beyond the tasks performed at the place of work. As Berdahl (2005: 241) 
observes, the workplace in the GDR was not only the centre of everyday sociality, but also a 
symbolic space of social membership and national belonging. “Our factory was our family”, many 
former Sachsenring workers say. Sachsenring employees, for example, enjoyed many advantages 
in that the enterprise had its own kindergarten, polyclinic, and sports teams and provided good 
holiday spots (Ferienplätze) on Lake Balaton or in the Erzgebirge. These advantages, which went 
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far beyond monetary compensation, constituted the so-called “Zweite Lohntüte”, or “social wage”, 
which made maintaining social relationships at work crucial for one’s quality of life. As Thelen 
(2005: 8) emphasizes, relationships to and in the workplaces became “multifunctional” as the 
redistributive power of the enterprises increased in the early 1970s. 
In large enterprises like Sachsenring there was a constant shortage of skilled workers 
(Fachkräftemangel), which also made the workers feel important and needed. At Sachsenring the 
shortage of skilled workers and the high amount of fluctuation became especially problematic in 
the 1970s, when the production volumes of the Trabant were rapidly rising. The management tried 
to resolve this issue by attracting former coal miners, workers from the northern part of the GDR, 
and foreign workers from Vietnam. Reflecting this, one of the lectures delivered by a former 
Sachsenring engineer at the August Horch museum discussed structural labour migration within the 
GDR and was titled “Alles was jung ist und Hände hat nach Zwickau, an den Trabant” (“Everyone 
who is young and has two hands – off to Zwickau, to [work on] the Trabant”). However, the 
turnover meant that the new workers needed time to learn the skills, which had a negative effect on 
productivity (Friedreich 2008). 
The shortage of skilled labour was not unique to Sachsenring, and finding a new job somewhere 
else did not take long for most workers. As one of the former shop-floor workers told me, he had to 
keep it a secret that he left his job with the railway in order to start working in automobile 
production, because it was frowned upon when the automotive industry “stole” workers from the 
railways. This competition among the enterprises for the workers contributed to their sense of self-
worth and pride and gave them a sense of security, which made experiences of the shortage of jobs 
after 1989 especially painful. As an example, the dominant narrative regarding Volkswagen’s 
investment in the region in the postsocialist era is that of saving the workers and giving them hope 
amidst the dangers of unemployment. However, the workers themselves try to reclaim their agency 
by pointing out how well-educated and hard-working the former Sachsenring workers that VW re-
employed were: “Imagine how much they saved on training costs!” one of the shop-floor workers 
told me. 
The high symbolic status of the workers was also supported by the state ideology, even though 
it did not necessarily bring privileged status in terms of access to material goods or political power. 
As one study carried out in the 1970s shows, the status of a worker was so highly valued socially 
that almost everyone, from the shop-floor worker to the plant manager, was willing to identify 
themselves with the working class (Engler 1999). Because of this high status of the workers in the 
GDR, it has been called an “arbeiterliche Gesellschaft” (workers’ society) (Engler 1999), and the 
state called itself an “Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Staat” (workers’ and peasants’ state) – a phrase which 
many of my informants often used, not without a certain irony, to describe the advantageous 
position of the shop-floor workers compared to other employees. The actual experiences of the 
workers certainly varied depending on the industry and enterprise, and the reality of the “workers’ 
state” was hardly as harmonious as presented in the state propaganda. Nevertheless, my data 
suggest that the higher symbolic status of work, and especially of industrial labour, had a major 
impact on workers’ identities, self-image, and the feelings of self-worth, making the subsequent 






The Repercussions of 1989 for the East German Labour Market  
 
By the end of 1994 the Treuhand had 12,354 VEBs in its portfolio, 3,718 of which were shut down. 
Some of my interlocutors in Zwickau maintained that many enterprises were prematurely closed 
down in order to either speed up the privatization process or to kill off the competition for Western 
companies. The textile industry in the Zwickau region was often mentioned as an example of such 
a sell-out. Some enterprises, like Sachsenring, went through a long cycle of new investments and 
bankruptcies. Enterprises which survived and were assessed as profitable were privatized by mostly 
Western investors. In some cases, the enterprises were sold for a symbolic value of one German 
mark. In the wake of such a shock therapy, more than 1 million people lost their jobs after 
reunification and the real unemployment rate has been estimated as reaching 40% in the early 
1990s (Turner 1998). As Mau (2019: 151) put it, many of the Werktätige (working people) turned 
into Untätige (idle people). 
Unemployment did not affect all groups of society equally. The damage varied depending on 
qualifications, age, and gender (Trappe 2006). For example, more than one million of those who 
were between 50 and 65 at the time of the Wende were forced into early retirement (Vorruhestand) 
(Mau 2019: 155). Mau suggests that early retirement might have been a rather desirable middle-
class aspiration in West Germany at the time, but in the East it was an involuntarily imposed 
measure that often led to material, social, and cultural dispossession. Due to the premature end of 
their working lives, the pensions of the early-retired were low, their social networks were torn 
apart, and their sense of self-worth was threatened. As a result, many of the early-retired see 
themselves as the actual losers of the transition (Mau 2019: 155). 
It is also essential to consider the dimension of gender in connection with work in East 
Germany, especially as compared to pre-reunification West Germany. In 1989 the participation of 
women in the economy as a labour force in East Germany was extremely high (one of the highest 
in the world) – 89%, compared to 92% for men. In West Germany in the same year only 56% of 
women had jobs, compared to 83% for men (Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004). The difference 
can be explained in terms of both ideology and state policies. Post-reunification, women were 
affected by unemployment disproportionately more than men, which also resulted in changes in 
their position in the family and household duties (Rudd 2006). 
In East Germany, women also had more options for combining family and childcare with work. 
For example, in Sachsenring plant, the kindergarten was located right next to the factory gate, and 
the workers’ children were guaranteed a spot there. Most of my female interlocutors in Zwickau 
who had some experience of working in socialism were proud of their independent status compared 
to the West German women. The automotive industry has always been more male-dominated, 
especially when many of the processes were still done manually and required strength. Even so, at 
the end of the 1980s, about 30% of Sachsenring employees were women, whereas today women 
make up only about 11% of the workforce at Volkswagen Sachsen. None of my female informants 
who used to work in Sachsenring in traditionally “masculine professions”, such as machinist, 
welder, or locksmith, continued doing the same type of work after the Wende. Most of them went 
through temporary unemployment and then acquired new qualifications. One of them, for example, 
worked for a food delivery service and then became a physiotherapist.  
Many were shocked to discover the degree to which the new society to which they now 
belonged “tolerated unemployment” (Rudd 2006). The state found itself unable to fulfil the 
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promise of “blooming landscapes” (blühende Landschaften)11 as it became clear that the disparity 
between the East and the West would persist for many years to come. This failed promise, the sell-
out (Ausverkauf) and closing of the enterprises, as well as the activities of the Treuhand in general, 
sparked protests and factory sit-ins all over East Germany (Böick 2012). Some of the protests took 
place symbolically on Mondays, continuing the tradition of “Montagsdemos” of the Peaceful 
Revolution in 1989–1990 in the months leading to German reunification. Even today, there is little 
mention of these post-reunification protests in the media and public discourse. Mr Baumann and 
some other people in Zwickau I spoke to were rather critical of these protests. They saw the 
workers who participated in the protests as lazy and naive people who expected to get Western 
salaries and consumer goods without risking their security on the labour market. As a former 
Sachsenring accountant described them: 
 
“My husband was retired then, and I haven’t experienced unemployment either. But millions, 
millions were unemployed. And there were no jobs [Arbeitsplätze] anymore. But some also 
exploited the state in the GDR era. For example, with working time. We had punch cards 
[Stechkarten], and many of the workers punched their cards there where the time-keeping was. 
They should have worked until 4 p.m., but sometimes they stood there a quarter of an hour 
before. Many people didn’t really like to work. And such people, they thought when the West 
comes, and we will get Western money [Westgeld], and then the ‘fried ducks’ fly into our 
mouths without having to work for it. They didn’t expect that one has to really toil away 
[rabotten] so that he can live. And those people were the first on the street, unemployed. Some 
people were naive [blauäugig], they let themselves be dazzled, the main thing was – Western 
money. And then they were on the streets.” 
 
This image of the bitter and disillusioned East Germans is also often employed to stress that, 
firstly, they were naive and not aware of how market economy works, and, secondly, that they had 
poor work ethics and self-discipline. This narrative also delegitimizes the protests of the early 90s, 
hinting that these people were always dissatisfied and that is just how they are. However, when I 
asked my informants about their expectations about the outcome of the Peaceful Revolution, most 
of them confessed that they had no idea what was coming, but they knew that politically it could 
not go on like that. They also did not admit to having had any illusions themselves about the 
perfect and shining West. It was always some “others” who got fooled. Nor did any of my 
interlocutors say that they were dazzled by the consumer choice they acquired: “Well, we didn’t 
have bananas, but we just ate apples then, so what? We were actually healthier back then because 
we would only eat the fruits and vegetables which were fresh in this season.” Many East Germans, 
in fact, preferred window-shopping to a frenzy of consumption and actually concentrated on 
saving, because of the uncertainty of their future (Dale 2006). It is also possible that some of my 
informants may downplayed the consumer boom as a technique for resisting the narrative of the 




                                                     
11 Blühende Landschaften was a phrase often used by Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany during the Wende period, to 
describe his vision of how the new German states would develop in the first three to four years after reunification. 
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“Selling Oneself” on the Labour Market: the Saxony Development and Qualification 
Company 
 
Apart from the unemployed, almost 2 million were put on “Kurzarbeit” (short-time working) with 
an average of a 50% reduction of working hours (Völkel 1997). Kurzarbeit is a social security 
measure that is meant to prevent lay-offs and allow companies keep their employees even in a 
difficult financial situation because the money for the missing working hours is paid by the Federal 
Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). However, in post-reunification East Germany, 
Kurzarbeit was hardly effective as a way of sustaining employment. Although intended as a 
temporary measure until the company could get back on its feet, it was very often followed by the 
bankruptcy of a company. It is especially true for those employees who were put on “Kurzarbeit 
Null”, which usually meant that an employee did not work at all and was sent to the 
Transfergesellschaft (transitional employment agency), which was intended to provide workers 
with training and qualification. For the workers, however, it mostly meant that they had some 
additional time to look for a new job, but the hope that they would be coming back to the same 
enterprise after Kurzarbeit Null was almost non-existent.  
Employment at Sachsenring also dropped tremendously, from 11,500 people in 1989 to 6,500 in 
1991 and 2,200 in 1992. As the anxieties concerning lay-offs grew, the workforce organized a 
protest in order to urge the Treuhand to set up an employment and training agency, or indeed to 
come up with any solution that would take care of the soon-to-be-laid-off workers. After a number 
of conflicts, strikes, and sit-ins and with the support of the then-Minister-President of Saxony, Kurt 
Biedenkopf, the Sächsische Aufbau- und Qualifizierungsgesellschaft (Saxony Development and 
Qualification Company, SAQ) was founded despite the Treuhand’s reluctance. For the Treuhand, it 
meant more spending, but for the workers, it was their first victory, and an important one. The plant 
occupation by over 1,000 workers in 1991 was a turning point for the establishment of SAQ 
(Turner 1998). Mr Baumann, however, thought that the real number of protesters was smaller and 
that it was just a few works council members with nothing but their own interests in mind. In its 
initial stage, SAQ took on 3,600 employees and 550 trainees and was considered a successor of 
Sachsenring’s works council and the local IG Metall office (Swain 2002). Legally, it was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Sachsenring. 
SAQ provided re-training programmes for the workers and was supposed to help them find 
subsequent re-employment. Many of the training sessions concentrated on labour market skills, for 
example, writing a good resume or a job application; others prepared people for work in sales or 
marketing. Thus, it can be said that this training was mostly supposed to educate people about the 
market economy and what one should do to become successful in it. The teachers were mostly 
university professors or teachers “von drüben” (from “yonder”, i.e. West Germany). Parallels can 
be drawn with the post-reunification “consumer training” practices described in Berdahl’s (2005) 
research on consumption and citizenship and their importance in the context of belonging. Much 
like the seminars that were meant to teach East Germans how to consume (in Berdahl’s example, 
beauty products for women), SAQ and similar job training programmes offered workers instruction 
in selling their own “fictitious commodity” – labour. Berdahl’s observations regarding 
consumption and citizenship can be extended to labour-market behaviour as well. For the East 
Germans to become “deserving citizens”, they were required to accept the rules of the game and to 
learn how to “sell themselves” and to behave on the labour market in order to be successful.  
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The attitudes towards SAQ among the research participants in Zwickau were quite ambivalent. 
Active union members from IG Metall said that its role was crucial in terms of the mobilization of 
the workers and their re-employment. The managers and engineers mostly argued that it was a 
useless organization which reinforced workers’ inactivity on the labour market, had a demoralizing 
influence on them, and did not really help them find new jobs. Some of my interlocutors even went 
so far as to say that SAQ was used as a scheme for subsidy fraud. Suspicion and mistrust were in 
general very prominent when people talked about the Wende era. And the mistrust was hardly 
groundless. For example, many of the former Sachsenring workers who stayed in the enterprise 
after privatization had to go through the scandal involving its new owners, the Rittinghaus brothers.  
For the most part, the workers who went through training at SAQ neither praised nor 
condemned it. Elke, who had just finished her apprenticeship at Sachsenring in 1990 and ended up 
being employed at SAQ, saw it as a quite positive development. Not only did it help Elke 
practically, as her time at SAQ coincided with her pregnancy, but it also provided a sort of bridge, 
a safety net that gave her time to adapt. She explained that it was very important for her 
psychologically that she did not just start getting unemployment benefits but still felt that she was 
working and remained embedded in the social networks at work. 
Almost all of my informants agreed that the trainings that SAQ provided were rather pointless 
in terms of employment and were mainly meant to keep the workers “off the streets”. Keeping 
them off the streets basically meant preventing both unemployment and protests on the streets. 
“These training companies mushroomed all over and got a lot of funding, SAQ as well. And they 
offered pointless trainings, which mostly achieved nothing. The people didn’t find jobs through 
that. Pointless, because there were no jobs here…All the enterprises were closed”, said Mrs 
Schulze, a former accountant at Sachsenring. Mrs Schulze’s life was closely entwined with 
Sachsenring, where she had worked for almost 20 years before the Wende. In addition to 
accounting, she led fitness courses at the enterprise, through which she also met her husband – an 
engineer who worked on the development of the Trabant. After the Wende, she had to go through a 
re-training programme because of the differences in tax law in the GDR and in unified Germany, 
but she did not receive training at SAQ. She then found a job as an accountant in a new office of a 
small West German company in Zwickau, where she worked until retirement. 
Those who were not employed at SAQ tended to regard employment there as useless, a sort of 
mock-labour (Rajković 2017). Some sympathized with SAQ workers, but in general they saw 
association with SAQ as a sign of weakness and the inability to make it on one’s own without 
external support or paternalistic measures. As Mrs Schulze told me: 
 
“I have never been unemployed, but these people, many people, who were thrown around 
from one training scheme to another…These are the ones who don’t even get the minimum 
pension. It is bad to be unemployed when you are young, but if you don’t have enough money 
when you are older, you feel a certain shame or [wounded] pride in going to the 
unemployment office. I am glad I didn’t have to go through that. I saw in 1990, in our 
company, in Sachsenring, how it was falling apart. And I quit on my own before I could be 
thrown out on the street. I made an effort to find a new job, and I found it. Of course, I spent 
three years on the school bench at the age of 45, I studied to be a tax specialist. They all could 





Mrs Schulze’s career can be considered successful insofar as she managed to avoid unemployment 
up until her retirement; and her success definitely became a part of her personality, as she seemed 
to derive her sense of self-worth from it to a great extent. The ambivalent attitudes towards SAQ 
that I discussed in this part of the paper show how different groups of people, informed by their 
class positions, values and life experiences, choose to support or criticize a particular form of 
workers’ mobilization. In line with Palomera and Vetta (2016), this case illustrates how moral 
reasoning can be explored not only in relation to leftist “countermovements” (Polanyi 2001), 
striving to re-embed the economy, but also to the lack or condemnation of such mobilizations. 
 
Employment and Welfare State Retrenchment in East Germany  
 
Economic growth and investment in East Germany increased rapidly after reunification, as many 
investors came there, first and foremost, to enjoy the benefits of its labour market, with its highly 
skilled workers ready to work for much less money than in the West. Many business people came 
looking for workers to take with them to work in the “old federal states”.12 Those who went 
complained that their West German and even their Turkish colleagues would often show hostility 
towards them because they felt that the cheap workforce from the East undermined their position 
on the labour market. As one of my informants, who commuted to work in Baden-Württemberg 
shortly after the Wende, remembered, “Back then we were third-class citizens, not even second-
class. First came the Wessis, then the Turks, and then us”. In the East, they could not find jobs, and 
in the West they experienced both the disruption of their family life (due to long commutes) and 
hostility from the local labourers. Some other automotive-industry workers I have met had to 
commute to Bavaria for two days a week, which means three hours of driving both ways. Under 
these conditions, many stayed in the West, but many others returned once the jobs slowly began to 
reappear in the East, even though the salaries were still low in comparison. The situation was also 
hardly stable, as unemployment was still high and every fluctuation on the labour market was 
always more visible in the East than it was elsewhere in Germany. 
The next crisis after the Wende was caused by the reforms of Agenda 2010, which were 
connected with one of the most substantial cuts of the social security system in German history. 
Agenda 2010 was implemented starting in 2003 in response to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy – a plan 
for making member states’ economies more competitive and knowledge-based, as well as 
providing better jobs. Promoted by then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the Agenda 2010 measures 
entailed substantial withdrawal of the state from the social security system and were, for the most 
part, received negatively, not only by the population but also by the members of Schröder’s own 
Social Democratic Party (SPD). The reform included such neoliberal measures as the weakening of 
job protection and the reduction of social costs for the employer at the expense of the employees. 
As Schröder described the reform: “We will reduce the state benefits, promote individual 
responsibility, and require more personal contribution from each individual.”13 
The most hated parts of Agenda 2010 were the changes, known as the Harz IV reform, 
concerning unemployment and the corresponding benefits. The adoption of Hartz IV meant that the 
                                                     
12 The “old federal states” (alte Bundesländer) refer the ten states which belonged to West Germany (formally the 
Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG) before reunification in 1990. The “new federal states” (neue Bundesländer), are 
the states of the former GDR. 
13“Wir werden Leistungen des Staates kürzen, Eigenverantwortung fördern und mehr Eigenleistung von jedem Einzelnen 
abfordern müssen.” (Deutscher Bundestag Sitzung 14.03.2003: Plenarprotokoll 15/32. Stenografischer Bericht). 
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benefits for long-term unemployed (Arbeitslosenhilfe) were significantly decreased and brought to 
the level of general welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe). The new unemployment benefits 
(Arbeitslosengeld II) amounted to around 300 euros per month. Hartz IV was seen as a betrayal by 
the SPD of its own voters, and the support for the SPD decreased dramatically thereafter. As one of 
my informants, 49-year-old trade union activist Stefan told me: “They lost people’s trust. I was an 
SPD voter, now I am not, now I vote for the Left, but many others have no idea who to vote for 
now. Once I came to work and asked my colleague, who he voted for. And he said FDP.14 FDP?! 
Can you imagine a shop-floor worker who votes for FDP?! That is how confused the people are.” 
In 2004, the Hartz IV reform sparked protests against the cuts to social welfare (Sozialabbau) 
all over Germany. The protests were carried out on Mondays and had the name of Montagsdemos, 
which was criticized by the government as suggesting an inappropriate analogy with the 
demonstrations of the Peaceful Revolution. The demonstrations were initially organized by the 
MLPD (Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany, a marginal radical left party) but later lost their 
connection to any political party and were only directed against Hartz IV. The East was once again 
at the vanguard of the protests – a point that was often depicted in the media as an expression of the 
longing of the East Germans for a more paternalistic state. The negative discourse surrounding the 
Hartz IV protests reinforced the depiction of East Germans as lacking in initiative and 
independence. In contrast, many of my interlocutors in Zwickau thought that the East Germans, or 
sometimes specifically Saxonians, were politically more active and more sensitive to undesirable 
changes. Another explanation for this stronger response from the East is, of course, simply the 
much higher unemployment rate there (18.4% compared to 8.5% in the West in 2004).15 
The Agenda 2010 is often called a success because unemployment in Germany did gradually 
fall from 10.5% to the average of 5% in 2019 and because the economy has grown steadily since 
then – although the causal link between the reform and subsequent developments has not been 
proven. The unemployment rate fell especially in the East, which could be partially explained by 
the fact that some of the long-term unemployed who had lost their jobs during the Wende reached 
retirement age. However, the reform is also criticized for having negative consequences such as 
growing inequality and poverty. It has led to a stronger stigmatization of the unemployed in public 
discourse and caused a boom in temporary employment agencies (Leiharbeitsfirmen). People 
preferred temporary employment, even with poor working conditions, to becoming a Hartz IV 
recipient, which was both morally and financially disastrous.  
According to the study Angst im Sozialstaat (“Fear in the social state”) by Betzelt and Bode 
(2017), the liberalization of the social security system is to blame for today’s “social crisis” and 
political polarization in Germany. The authors argue that the retrenchment of the welfare state and 
the subsequent “re-commodification” of employment have led to feelings of fear and insecurity in 
the general population. This “spiral of fear” resulted in social and political tensions and growing 
support for the far right. Stigmatization and delegitimization of unemployment also increased 
precarity among the workers: precarious workers accept their position in order to avoid becoming a 
“Hartzer”, and members of the regular workforce are ready to subject themselves to more flexible 
conditions and more intense exploitation in order to secure their employment in the future. My 
ethnographic data also support this thesis. Bernd, a 51-year-old Volkswagen shop-floor worker, 
                                                     
14 The FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei), or liberal party, falls in the centre to centre-right of the political spectrum. In 
the latest state parliament elections in Saxony in 2019, the party did not manage to achieve the quota of 5% necessary for 
representation in the legislature. 
15 Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf 02/2014. 
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expresses this connection very clearly when he reflects on how he takes pride in his readiness to be 
more flexible than the others: 
 
“It doesn’t matter what kind of luxury you have, at some point you are full and you want 
more. When you lose a relationship with reality… But when I look at someone who works in a 
small firm, all he has to do for half of the money I get here! Then I say it doesn’t matter for 
me if I have to work a bit faster, or if I have to do a bit more. But there are people who…Like 
I said, I have never been unemployed, but there are people who came to us from 
unemployment in 1997, in my team…And five years later they forgot, how it was [to be 
unemployed]!”  
 
In my field site in Zwickau, the protests against Hartz IV were initially quite strong. They started in 
August 2004 and during some of the protests over 4,00016 people gathered on the main square. The 
protests continue even after 15 years, as the local MLPD leader stands every Monday at 5 p.m. 
together with about seven to ten people in front of the shopping mall Arcaden in downtown 
Zwickau. When I first encountered the protesters, they were holding a poster featuring the slogan, 
“Wir wollen Arbeit, von der wir leben können! Keine Almosen! Weg mit Hartz IV – das Volk sind 
wir!”17 Later their leader, a history professor who had migrated from West Germany, told me that 
they started the demonstrations together with the trade unions. However, the trade union almost 
immediately distanced itself from the MLPD, and thereafter there were two separate Monday 
demonstrations in Zwickau. In November 2004 the trade unions stopped organizing demonstrations 
under some pressure from the SPD. Thereafter, the MLPD demonstration continued with its few 
but persistent protesters. At the time of my fieldwork in 2018–2019, I witnessed a few of their 
demonstrations in town and asked some of my informants what they thought about it. The reaction 
was mostly indifferent or sarcastic, as they made fun of the protesters and their leader. This shift 
from a mainstream protest to a protest of a marginal group is representative of greater patterns in 
East Germany – left-leaning protest being undermined and pushed to the margins by neoliberal 
hegemony. Such an inability to mobilize against the neoliberal agenda has also been discussed in 
the context of the rise of right-wing populism (Kalb and Halmai 2011).  
As a part of an election campaign in March 2019, a few leaders from the SPD, the party which 
was primarily responsible for Hartz IV, visited Zwickau to lead a town hall meeting-style event 
(called a Küchentischgespräch, or “kitchen-table talk”). The name of this event was “What comes 
after Hartz IV?”, and the clear proposal of the party was introducing “Bürgergeld”, or basic 
income. The format of this discussion allowed the public to sit at the “kitchen table” together with 
the politicians and ask them questions. Although this event took the form not of a discussion but of 
a series of monologues by politicians, some people managed to pose questions and share their 
concerns. One of them, a young woman in her late 30s, started her speech with a phrase “I am very 
nervous because I want to ‘out’ myself [mich outen] – I am a Hartz IV recipient”. She went on to 
talk about the stigmatization and the shame that she was subjected to. “We are not all lazy or 
incapable. There is a story behind each of us”, she said with her voice shaking.  
 
                                                     
16 Proteste verlieren an Kraft – Schröder sucht Verbündete. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 September 2004. 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/hartz-iv-proteste-verlieren-an-kraft-schroeder-sucht-verbuendete-1176540.html  
17 “We want work that we can live on! Not charity! Away with Hartz IV – we are the people!” 
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Shortage of Skilled Labour 
 
After peaking at 18.7% in 2005,18 the unemployment rate in East Germany has been steadily 
declining, generally echoing the trends in the West. As of October 2019, the unemployment rate in 
East Germany was 6.1%, compared to 4.6% in the West. Saxony’s unemployment rate, 5.1%, falls 
in the very middle of the range across all German states.19 Therefore, unemployment is not framed 
by the media as being a central problem in Saxony anymore. Quite the opposite: the state of 
Saxony is on the verge of an extreme shortage of skilled labour, amounting to some 82,000 
workers by 2025, according to estimates by the Leipzig Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
(Industrie- und Handelskammer, IHK).20 The labour shortage has been widely instrumentalized in 
political discussions in Saxony in the last few years. It has also been used as a tool to promote 
neoliberal views regarding both the East-West divide and migration. Before the state parliament 
elections of 2019 the current leader of the liberal party, the FDP, Christian Lindner held a speech in 
downtown Zwickau, in which he emphasized the need for immigration in order to cover the 
growing need for workers. He was particularly in favour of accepting educated people from 
“Belarus or Bangladesh”, whereas unskilled refugees whose lives are not in danger should be sent 
back to their homelands. Considering the low level of support for the party in Saxony, the turnout 
for his speech was quite impressive, probably first and foremost due to his reputation as a 
spectacular speaker. The reaction to his speech was quite mixed, but his take on migration and the 
shortage of labour managed to earn some enthusiastic applause from the audience.  
Shortage of labour is also used to justify claims that the economy of former East Germany is 
booming and that the gap between the two parts of Germany is slowly disappearing. This 
celebratory discourse was also used by the head of an employment agency in Zwickau when he 
mentioned the decreasing number of unemployed “clients” as one of the reasons for moving the 
agency into a smaller building. However, the current and predicted future shortage of workers is 
caused not just by a booming industry, but also by the migration of educated professionals to the 
West and by the ageing population. It can also be explained by the low quality of the jobs on the 
market, which are characterized by low salaries and precarious status. Moreover, the shortage of 
qualified workers is felt mostly intensely in branches such as healthcare and eldercare. In other 
branches, the demand is mostly for highly educated engineers.  
Another reason for the shortage of labour is that the companies in the East are often essentially 
“extended workbenches” (verlängerte Werkbänke); i.e., their activities are limited to production 
and manufacturing, with the research and management departments residing in the West. Industrial 
labour, as my informants made clear in their descriptions of their work, is difficult, monotonous 
and physically demanding, in addition to the negative aspects of shift work in general.21 One of the 
automotive supplier companies I visited was especially glad that the temporary employment 
agency had “sent” them a few refugee workers, despite the conflicts that it caused within the 
                                                     
18 Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf 02/2014 
19 Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Monatsbericht zum Arbeits- und Ausbildungsmarkt, October 2019.  
20 IHK zu Leipzig. IHK-Fachkräftemonitor: 2025 fehlen 82.000 qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte in Sachsen, 25 April 2019: 
https://www.leipzig.ihk.de/ihre-ihk/aktuelles/archiv/details/artikel/ihk-fachkraeftemonitor-2025-fehlen-82000-
qualifizierte-arbeitskraefte-in-sachsen-3597/ (accessed 19.12.2019). 
21 The automotive industry in and around Zwickau is mostly organized to fit the rhythm of the Volkswagen plant in 
Mosel and it functions according to the principle of “just-in-time” production, which means that neither Volkswagen nor 
its suppliers use warehouses. The components are instead delivered right before they are used. Work is divided in three 
shifts: early, late, and night shift.  
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existing team. He complained that they could hardly find the workers locally to do this heavy work. 
“Young people don’t want to work on the conveyor belt”, said one of the shift managers as he 
showed me around. Nevertheless, the shortage of labour is used as a convenient argument to 
downplay unemployment in Saxony and to frame it as an individual rather than a structural 
problem. Such a framing weakens the legitimacy of workers’ claims and denies them their histories 




After starting this paper with the story of Mr Baumann, I would like to come back to it once again, 
before I summarize my conclusions. Mr Baumann’s opinions on unemployment seemed to me 
extremely disconnected from his own life story, which was torn between the feelings of shame and 
pride. For more than a decade he had worked 12 to 14 hours a day from Monday to Saturday, only 
to be thrown out by his boss when his health failed him. Knowing Mr Baumann’s story, it is hard to 
call him a “winner” of the transition, even though he takes pride in making the best of this 
situation. As he himself admits, despite his entrepreneurial qualities and willingness to work hard, 
he became unemployed early, before reaching retirement age. However, Mr Baumann desperately 
resists being lumped together with those “losers of the transition” who failed to adapt to the new 
system. He makes sure that he separates himself from them as he describes his independence, 
individualism, and diligence: “I did everything on my own. I felt like a businessman”, he says 
when he describes his work for the car dealership company. His internal conflict can be understood 
in terms of the sharp disparity between his aspirations and moral values of being an entrepreneurial 
type, a self-made man, and his inability to fulfil the expectations of such an ethical commitment – 
and in terms of the resulting demoralization (Rajković 2017: 65).  
As previous research in the anthropology of postsocialism argues (Bartha 2013; Dunn 2004; 
Dale 2006), the lived experience of socialism has provided a foundation for people to question and 
contest the viability of modern capitalism. In this paper, I tried to explore the opposite process – the 
prevalence of neoliberal hegemony, which is scarcely contested even by those who might be 
expected to be critical of it. Following Kalb (2014: 198), I look at neoliberalism “not as a culture 
that produces a particular personhood but as a hegemony that exerts specific pressures and sets 
certain limits on the possible paths of personal becoming”. Hegemony is thus seen not as a cultural 
consensus but a field of social relations of dominance. Accordingly, I have tried to shed light on 
particular narratives and processes that contributed to the establishment of such a hegemony: the 
heightened moral and social importance of work in postsocialist societies, the turbulent labour 
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